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ARTICLE
Intelligence in a modern insurgency: the case of the Maoist
insurgency in Nepal
Paul Jackson
ABSTRACT
Outside some well-known movements like Al Qaeda, there is little under-
standing of how insurgent movements in the Global South gather, process
and manage intelligence. This paper is based on ﬁeldwork in Nepal with
former members of the Maoist Army. The Maoists fought a secretive insur-
gency war for ten years, signing a peace agreement in 2006. Fieldwork
involved former combatants, intelligence oﬃcers and Maoist cadres and
analyses the intelligence methodology of the Maoist insurgency, placing
this in to the context of Nepal Government operations. TheMaoists beneﬁted
frompoor opponentsbut theydid establish aneﬀective systemof intelligence
into operations.
Introduction
The literature on intelligence rarely addresses intelligence structures and use within insurgent
groups.1 This is for a series of good reasons, not least because insurgent groups tend to be very
secretive generally, and intelligence tends to be particularly sensitive, but also they also tend to
lack formal, codiﬁed and documented systems that can be analysed by researchers after the events.
Intelligence operators can also be extremely diﬃcult to reach and are rarely willing to talk on
record about previous experience of intelligence gathering and use, particularly where post-conﬂict
measures like transitional justice are in operation. As a result, the intelligence literature rarely
analyses comparative intelligence services within insurgent groups or the demand or usage of
intelligence by those groups.2,3 Geographically, this has also been reinforced by a bias in intelli-
gence writing towards the Anglosphere, with an increasing number focussing on Soviet and post-
Soviet space4 and also the treatment of foreign intelligence services and non-state actors. However,
Africa and South Asia are more or less absent from intelligence writing despite the fact that these
geographical regions have been the focus of the vast majority of post-Second-World War violence.
This article therefore makes a signiﬁcant contribution to the literature by describing the
intelligence activities of the United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (the ‘Maoists’) during
their period of insurgency from 1996 to 2006. The article describes the intelligence activities of
the Maoists and analyses how they were able to develop a critical advantage in many areas over
their opponents and makes contribution to the existing literature on the complexity of insurgent
intelligence operations in the global South, something that the extant literature is very reluctant to
acknowledge.5 Given the paucity of academic literature in this ﬁeld, the paper follows the example
of Gentry and Spencer in not concentrating on theorizing Maoist intelligence or rigorously
comparing the Maoists with the FARC, but concentrating on the basic facts and using analysis of
intelligence rooted in the theoretical literature: organisational structure; functions; consumers;
external relationships; and performance.6
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The paper begins with a discussion about the methodology used in gathering data, which is
always partial. However, the author was given extensive access to a wide range of intelligence
actors from the period on both sides and over a period from 2009 until 2017. Consequently one
element of the signiﬁcance of this work is that it is based on ﬁrst-hand accounts of intelligence
actors themselves talking about the nuts and bolts of intelligence collection and their philosophy
of intelligence. Despite the limitations of researching an area where triangulation is diﬃcult, this
adds credibility to the overall analysis.
Following a section on methodology, the paper then moves on to discuss the context of the
insurgency itself, then concentrating on the intelligence organisation and infrastructure. It then goes
through the core features of an intelligencemechanism placing the activities of the Maoist system in to
a formal structure, governed by a Central Intelligence Bureau (CIB), and providing practical examples of
activities where possible. Finally the paper comes to a conclusion that a series of contextual factors –
notably the failure of state intelligence – enhanced an already capable intelligence mechanism. The
Maoist insurgents understood the importance of intelligence in their strategy, not just in terms of
operational eﬀectiveness, targeting and counter-intelligence, but also in developing an information
strategy to make themselves more acceptable to the local population.
A note on methodology
The Maoists are notoriously secretive as an insurgent movement, even amongst the pantheon of
insurgent movements. They have been very diﬃcult to break down from the point of view of
researchers, apart from at the village level, where some excellent work has been done on Maoist
inﬁltration and relationships with local communities.7
This work is based on research and policy work carried out over a number of years. The author
ﬁrst became involved in the Nepali peace process in 2008 as an external adviser to the Special
Committee of the Nepali Constituent Assembly on the reintegration of the Maoist Combatants. This
role continued until 2015. As an academic invited by former students to participate in the process,
I was able to develop considerable trust with several Maoist leaders and members of the military
and political groupings within the movement.8 My role was as a facilitator and as someone who
could act as an interpreter of the international community as well as someone who had worked in
this area before and could bring international experience.
This greatly privileged position allowed me to develop a research project supported by the
Government of Sweden that followed, interviewed and documented the transition to civilian life of
around 250 former combatants across Nepal. This research project also provided me with access to
a number of additional individuals who had been part of the Maoist intelligence network and I was
then able to interview them about their involvement. In this way I managed to carry out around 20
interviews speciﬁcally on intelligence. This was also supplemented by a ﬁeld trip to Dang and Rolpa
Districts, accompanied by a former senior intelligence commander and involving four district
intelligence chiefs, including along the border with India.9
Additional interviews were carried out with senior military commanders, including former and
current Chiefs of Army Staﬀ and senior commanders (all of whom deployed as commanders during
the war), as well as most of the Maoist High Command, and several middle level oﬃcials engaged
in the day to day management of intelligence in the districts. This included all of the central
intelligence group close to the command structure, and included, for example, Prachanda10
(Chairman), Baldev (intelligence commander and member of the Standing Committee of the
UCP(M)), Ananta (Divisional Commander and member of the Standing Committe), Nirmal GC
(intelligence oﬃcer and Battalion Vice Commander) and Milan (Zonal intelligence Commander,
Terai, and Prachanda’s ADC). We will return to Baldev and Milan below.
I was also able to interview several Nepal Army commanders and former oﬃcers involved in
military intelligence, who largely conﬁrmed the Maoist narrative, along with providing additional
information on the lack of intelligence they had on deploying to the ﬁeld.11 Therefore, I am
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conﬁdent that the paper provides an accurate, if incomplete, picture of Maoist intelligence during
the war.
Maoist people’s war in Nepal
In 1996 the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) declared the ‘people’s war’ in Nepal. The ultra-left
communist party declared this ‘people’s war’ to establish a ‘people’s democracy’ on 13 February 1996
by putting an end the multi-party democracy and constitutional monarchy that was established in
1990 following a popular movement.12 The CPN (Maoist) started armed activities from the Hill
districts of Nepal (Gorkha, Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan, Sindhuli, Jajarkot), mainly in the central belt in
the West, by attacking local police posts and cadres of political opponents, in particular, the Nepali
Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Uniﬁed Marxist Leninist) [CPN (UML)].13
In the aftermath of the initial armed attacks, the then government led by Nepali Congress
President Girija Prasad Koirala decided to mobilise the Nepal Police to control the insurgency. The
Nepal Police started by launching what have become two notorious operations – the ‘Romeo’ and
‘Kilo-Sera Two’ operations – in those districts to control the Maoist’s activities. Taking a very
aggressive approach to counter-insurgency with an inexperienced and under-resourced force led
to an excessive use of force, coupled with gross human rights violations by the Police involving
violent suppression of local civilian populations on the pretext of controlling the Maoist’s violent
activities. This initial approach not only failed to establish control but also led to severe criticism of
the security forces and managed to accelerate the rebellion through increasing support for the
Maoists amongst much of the rural civilian population.
Notably the army itself did not take a leading role in the counter-insurgency eﬀort until around
four years before the end of the war. The civilian police who were deployed across the districts
were backed up by various secret counter-insurgency units and special task forces, but most
commonly by a new paramilitary force, the Armed Police Force (APF). Along with an occasionally
heavy-handed approach to dealing with ‘People’s Enemies’ by the Maoists this resulted in wide-
spread suppression of the civilian population. The war itself produced several indirect casualties.
A low intensity war, the Nepali conﬂict was largely perpetrated through the extensive use of IEDs
and assassinations, but also widespread abductions and bombings, including of civilian vehicles.
A notable feature of the war was also the use of violence and intimidation for extortion. Around
17,886 people lost their lives during the armed conﬂict and around 1,530 people disappeared in
this decade, most of them during the state of emergency.14 In addition, 79,571 persons were
internally displaced during the armed conﬂict due to either Maoist violence or the counter
operations of the security agencies.15
A core tactic of the insurgency was to limit and reduce the inﬂuence and ability of the state at
the local level to provide services and security to the local population. The destruction of VDC
oﬃces and other local state institutional buildings was accompanied by the extensive abduction of
local government oﬃcers and sometimes their families. This degradation of the state outside the
main urban centres contributed to rapid urbanisation in the Kathmandu Valley and the Terai
Region creating signiﬁcant problems for the Nepali Government in re-establishing control and
service provision in the countryside. At the same time, the police, unable to defend isolated police
posts, with no equipment and ill-prepared for counter-insurgency, retreated to defensible areas
leaving large parts of the country without state security of any sort.16 This resulted in a loss of
conﬁdence in the security services that severely hampered their ability to collect any intelligence
outside urban areas and allowing the Maoists a virtual monopoly of intelligence in their core areas.
In interviews with senior military commanders and politicians on the government side at this time,
it is striking that they all say that they had virtually no intelligence at all on these areas, even when
they were deploying.
The ten year insurgency was a relatively low intensity conﬂict that escalated in to larger scale
violence. The beginning of the war was very much attacks by small groups of Maoist insurgents
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against isolated police posts, kidnappings, assassinations and the use of explosive devices against
targets regarded as legitimate, particularly the civilian police, the APF and later, the army.
Increasingly, however, the conﬂict escalated in to battles consisting of hundreds, if not more,
insurgents attacking static defences of the security services. These larger attacks were extremely
mixed, with more than 300 insurgents being killed as they attacked a military base at Khara in
Rukum District, for example, but overrunning a poorly sited base at Pili in Karnali District.
Eventually the Maoists tended to hold sway in the countryside and particularly in the hills, with
urban areas of the Kathmandu Valley and the Terai being disputed and the Maoists being unable to
eﬀectively remove the security services from most district capitals or from bases like Bhalubang in
Dang.17 By the time of the battle of Bhalubang, the actual ﬁghting had reached something of
a stalemate.18 The Maoist army was clearly unable to wage a full-sclae war because of lack of
resources and signiﬁcant outside support, whereas the Royal Nepal Army may have had some
resources, but was poorly trained, lacked core counterinsurgency skills – notably air power,
suﬃcient special forces and intelligence – and also suﬀered from lack of popular support amongst
the population. Government eﬀorts were also characterised by poor relationships and co-
ordination between services, at least partly as a result of interpersonal rivalries. This was not
helped by the political crisis following the palace massacre and the replacement of a popular
king with a very unpopular one and the inability of the political parties to work together. Eventually
the political issues and royal takeovers in 2002 and 2005 built up in to popular pressure and an all-
party alliance that allied with the Maoists to overthrow the regime. A ceaseﬁre in 2005 was
followed by a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006 after 10 years of war and the
Constituent Assembly was formed under a Republic, with the Maoists as the single biggest party.
The UCPN(M) is overtly Maoist in its approaches and tactical doctrine. At the time of its
emergence from a well-established broad communist opposition in the early 1990s, it explicitly
modelled itself on Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), and took almost all political commentators by
surprise.19 ‘People’s War was launched on 13 February 1996 and was viewed as an eﬀective way to
seize state power. Based on traditional communist rhetoric and approaches – establishment of
a ‘people’s republic’, an end to Indian imperialism, an end to capitalist exploitation and an end to
an exploitative social hierarchy, including caste – Maoism was explicitly used as a methodological
manual throughout the war. Since the system at the time was held to be ‘reactionary’ and
governed by ‘class enemies’, people’s war was held as the only way to bring this vision to fruition.
Taking inspiration from Shining Path and also from the various Naxalite movements across parts of
India, the insurgency was characterised by a mixture of inﬁltration in target areas and extreme
violence in the service of ‘elimination of class enemies’.20
The Maoists ‘progressive’ and ‘scientiﬁc’ ideology was grafted on to a practical approach to People’s
War based around establishing links in a local community through inﬁltration and then developing
a cadre-based clandestine governance infrastructure thatmay evolve in to the parallel structures within
occupied areas with People’s Courts and a functioning Maoist government. The Maoists claimed to be
working towards a political solution, which for most of the war consisted of a negotiated settlement
whereby non-Maoists would accede to their demands. An extensive clandestine governance network
requires a military organisation to provide security. A Maoist military approach is well deﬁned and falls
in to three stages: defensive; stalemate and oﬀensive. Essentially these stages are characterised by
diﬀerent approaches to thewar itself. The defensive stage is characterised by terror and guerrilla tactics.
The stalemate becomes more formal and involves mobile (or manoeuvre) warfare with roughly
equivalent military formations battling with state forces, but not seeking to hold territory. Lastly, the
‘war of position’ sees a strategic oﬀensive seeking to take and hold ground. In Nepal, the ﬁrst phase was
clearly deﬁned, and certainly the military hierarchy felt they were entering the second phase with the
launch of a general oﬀensive in November 2001. However, for much of the war, the Maoists did
eﬀectively hold territory in their heartlands in the Mid-West even if they did not claim ‘base areas’. In
addition, whilst the war did enter a second phase, performance on formal battleﬁelds tended to favour
the Government forces, particularly when they could dig in. However, a stalemate was eventually
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reached at least partly because of the lack of initiative on the part of the government and their lack of
agreed strategies and approaches.21
At its core, however, the Maoist movement is a very tight knit group who were there from the
very beginning. It may have a conventional military structure based on Chinese ranks – company
commander, brigade commander and then general – but the real cement that holds the movement
together is the level of personal trust between the core of individuals, alongside a network of political
commissars at all levels to ensure ideological commitment. The nature of the political and military
command structure is frequently seen as a simple ideological control, although extensive discussions
with oﬃcers of both types shows that there was certainly considerable pragmatism within these
relationships and at some levels, where the military commander was also a senior member of the
Party, there was felt to be no need for a commissar ﬁgure.22 What is also clear is that whilst there was
notionally a parallel structure of political and military oﬃcers, they frequently worked together and
developed trust between each other and in some cases, were the same person.23
Approaches to maoist intelligence
The Maoist Army established a Central Intelligence Bureau (CIB) that reported directly to the senior
command of the army in the early days of the war. There were no written manuals or guidance for
intelligence gathering. All intelligence networks needed some way of converting information in to
intelligence and this was incorporated inside some individuals who were trusted and given
individual authorities. CIB numbers are diﬃcult to ascertain. Although a ﬁgure on ‘around 100ʹ
was mentioned in one interview, it was also pointed out that this number varied over time, but was
also supplemented by people who had been trained and were linked to CIB, but who were
operating as ﬁeld oﬃcers. The CIB operated as a clearing house whose job was primarily to
organise training and processing of information for the high command. Raw information came
directly from the ﬁeld, usually via district commanders or from intelligence operators. This informa-
tion was then processed by CIB and then the ﬁnished intelligence passed on to the high command.
Whilst this was by no means the only intelligence route, this system had been designed early in the
insurgency and operated right through the conﬂict, and it is telling that the vast majority of the
training carried out was in information processing rather than gathering, suggesting that the
Maoists had recognised the importance of accurate intelligence.24
CIB did establish a rudimentary training programme for intelligence cadres. Training was carried
out within Nepal by those who were experienced in intelligence for a period of one month. I met
several senior level personnel who had taken part in the training, but also more junior oﬃcers who
had taken training as part of their role within the Maoist structure. There is no evidence of any
foreign inﬂuence over the training per se and certainly not the direct training. The idea of this
approach was to produce a small number of semi-professional intelligence cadres to operate
within CIB as information processors, but also a group of operational intelligence commanders
who could take local decisions but who could also identify what information could be used locally
and what needed to be passed to the CIB.
Many of these were located at the centre of the organisation to provide intelligence support,
but most were posted out to the divisional commands as ﬁeld operators. This suggests an
intelligence element to provide ‘strategic intelligence’ to leaders as well as smaller, lower-level
intelligence groups that provided local political support, tactical military targeting, and perhaps
counterintelligence. Many Maoist cadres, in keeping with Maoist doctrine, also contributed to
intelligence, but the idea was that there would be an intelligence commander in each district to
provide local intelligence, but also to act as a liaison with CIB and the centre. Decisions in general
within the Maoists were highly centralised and doctrine was extremely important in guiding
discipline of the movement. This also led to a form of organisation resembling the cell structures
present in other insurgency movements and based on Mao’s ‘Organization of a Guerrilla Company’
in his Appendix to On Guerrilla War. Whereby an intelligence oﬃcer forms one of the ﬁve executive
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members supporting the Company Commander, the Executive Oﬃcer and the Political Oﬃcer. This,
in turn, is supplemented by the Maoist idea that everyone in the movement and indeed, in the
area, is an intelligence asset.
The Maoist interpretation of that was to establish a centralised system of intelligence oﬃcers linked
back to the CIB, but with clear guidelines about localised decisions and activities. A hard core of
activists, sometimes from the very ﬁrst revolutionary cell, formed an inner circle that also internalised
intelligence as an activity. All six battalion commanders of the Maoist Army were drawn from this
group, alongwith several Politburomembers with special status, including Prachanga, Batterai, Ananta,
Pasang, Prabhakar and Baldev amongst others, and they all had intelligence responsibilities at strategic
level. All were trained in intelligence and some ran their own intelligence operations. Baldev ran an
intelligence operation for two years from a photography shop in the Terai.
In practice, the Maoist system was a hybrid that combined both a separate, centralised
intelligence operation and also involved some senior Maoists in intelligence gathering, which is
unusual. At the same time, and following Maoist doctrine, these professional intelligence gathering
activities were fed and supported by networks of local sympathisers in each area. In this way,
Maoist intelligence became highly eﬀective in rural areas where there was signiﬁcant sympathy for
the Maoists, but had issues and became increasingly reliant on professional intelligence gathering
in the more urbanised areas of the Kathmandu Valley and the Terai region. In these areas, the
Maoist intelligence operation was complicated by extensive vetting of potential volunteers and
their families and enforcement of party discipline.25
This structure also sought to overcome some of the central issues of all rural insurgency move-
ments, namely the quality of recruits. Much like the FARC in Colombia, the Maoist military recruited
mainly from rural areas amongst the most deprived sections of society. Recruiting large numbers of
female combatants and Dalits meant that there was a shortage of educated recruits. To compensate
for this, the Maoists initiated a series of educational policies within the movement,26 but also fell back
on to the structure built around the original members of the Maoist movement, many of whom were
upper caste, including Batterai, Prachanda and Baldev (all Brahmin). It was this core that held the
movement together and undertook a wide variety of activities as a narrow network of trusted leaders.
It should also be noted that the operational environment faced by the Maoists was largely
positive since the Government intelligence system was eﬀectively falling apart. The three main
intelligence agencies were the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), the Special Branch (police)
and the National Investigation Department (NID) which reports to the Ministry of Home Aﬀairs.
However, with a few temporal exceptions, none of these talked to each other they rarely reported
formally and there was little accountability. Consequently there were several instances where these
agencies worked against each other and may even have provided information to the Maoists as
part of this rivalry. Indeed the RNA oﬃcers interviewed, who had deployed during the war, were
disparaging of the amount and quality of any intelligence they received.27 Indeed, two senior
oﬃcers both said that the ﬁrst thing they had to do was to attempt to establish their own local
intelligence networks because they had no information at all, whereas the Maoists knew everything
about them – how many, which regiments, where they would be deployed and when. One oﬃcer
described this as ‘deploying blind’.
Intelligence organisation
Clearly the existence of a cadre of intelligence agents with some training within a CIB was designed
to facilitate an improvement of the analysis of information and its transformation in to useful
intelligence. However, the structure of the Maoist movement basically meant that the analysts and
the consumers could be the same individuals but that overall levels of intelligence were signiﬁ-
cantly improved by a separate analytical capability. The practice of sending senior members to the
ﬁeld as the core of an intelligence network led to the situation whereby they would sift through
6 P. JACKSON
information provided by district commanders and also from the networks themselves and then
report to meetings where they themselves were present.
The role of district commanders also provides a separation of useful local information from the
intelligence that is passed up the central chain to the high command. As a result, the system deployed
was again both centralised and decentralised with local military information shared at the local level
but a requirement for central approval meant that information sharing at least nominally took place. In
this way, the Maoist structure resembles that of the Viet Cong and Viet Minh, but also Al Qaeda,
Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers rather than, say the decentralised structure of the FARC.
Basic ﬁeld operations relied very much on the human structures of the Maoist organisation,
particularly on the decision-making of district commanders. As such, the system was centralised and
decentralised at the same time. Certain decisions – attacks, for example –were centralised and taken by
the Central Committee or in many instances under oversight of regional bureaus and command.
However, District commanders were able to act with discretion over some particular aspects, e.g.
certain types of assassination or robbery. It was up to the district chief to make decisions between
important and less important information, which is why so many were senior, trusted cadres.
It is important to note that there were instances of abuse of this system with some much power
vested in individuals. When district chiefs acted against the best interests of the Maoists, or were
judged to have not passed on relevant decisions, or in fact when they were deemed to be
following personal agendas, then they could be removed, suspended from their positions or
demoted from the Central Committee to the District Committee or to the Area Committee, and
so on. Of course, the acid test of this is whether any of them were actually removed, and in reality
this appears to have been very common. In one interview, we discussed one speciﬁc District Chief
(Akan) who was accused of acting against the Maoists and in his own interests. His particular crime
was said to have been assassinating personal enemies, rather than those necessary to the cause, or
those who had been sanctioned by the central Committee. Eventually he was removed and in his
case, he was banned from the party – the most serious action short of execution. He was later
assassinated by the military.
Intelligence collection and management
Mirroring the three stage structure of the People’s War strategy, Krause divides intelligence
management in to three distinct phases: organisational; guerrilla warfare; and conventional
warfare.28 However, as discussed above, this never happened in Nepal quite as cleanly as the
model suggests. Having discussed the way in which Maoist intelligence was organised, there are
questions about the practicality and management of intelligence itself and what the movement
actually did with its information. The Maoists relied heavily on HUMINT29 to support its intelligence
activities. It had little or no imagery capability, although it was adept at stealing intelligence and
other resources from the state forces, and Maoists did use mobile telecommunications and cameras
to spread information and also to ﬁlm barracks and installations prior to attack.30 There were
several examples of copied Government documents and training manuals being used by the
Maoists as the basis for their own operations. Maoist oﬃcers, for example, followed a similar
curriculum to the Nepal Army Oﬃcers because the materials were regularly stolen from Army HQ.
Internet access also provided additional sources of intelligence both through the wide use of
telecommunications, the provision of links to the outside world, and also open source intelligence.
Nevertheless it is also clear that the use of SIGINT was minor compared to HUMINT and the core of
the CIB work consisted of management of informant networks, surveillance of potential targets and
inﬁltration on diﬀerent levels.
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Informant networks
The most important element of intelligence gathering for the Maoists was undoubtedly through
informant networks. To an extent, most Maoist ﬁghters were trained to gather simple intelligence
on the ground and feed it back through the centralised command structure, or through the
intelligence cadres who frequently deployed in local areas. Every district across Nepal had an
intelligence commander and varying numbers of subordinates. This is, in itself, an interesting
feature of the strengths and weaknesses of this approach, not least because in strong Maoist
areas, there was strong Maoist intelligence, whereas in the Terai and in the Kathmandu Valley it
was much more dangerous to operate as intelligence gatherers or ﬁghters.
This was exacerbated by the further reliance on local populations as a key source of intelligence,
including wide networks of activists, sympathisers and also children. In fact, during an initial
interview with a senior intelligence commander, he stated that the Maoist Army ‘did not have
intelligence, we just asked people’, which is accurate within Maoist core areas and constitutes
a good, ideological answer.31 In strong Maoist areas and amongst particular ethnic groups like the
Maghar population, there was excellent intelligence, but this diminished once the war moved in to
the more mixed and mobile populations of the Terai, where more professional intelligence
operations had to be established to compensate.
Surveillance
There was no formal counterintelligence unit, rather the Maoists preferred to rely on personal ties
and structures, deploying systems of informants to undermine attempts made by the state to
penetrate the Maoist networks. This was particularly eﬀective in rural areas, where the state had
eﬀectively abdicated responsibility and where there were organised structures of resistance across
many of the districts even before the war. Indeed, some of the attempts by the intelligence
agencies to penetrate the Maoist heartlands were simply derisory.
One interviewee related a story about ﬁnding a former soldier who had been detailed to gather
intelligence information on local Maoist operations.32 In speaking to many Nepal Army comman-
ders who were deployed to the countryside at that time, they uniformly state that they had no
intelligence on local Maoist activities and they had to establish their own intelligence gathering
operations. This unfortunate soldier was chosen from the deployed troops and sent out to the
ﬁelds to pretend to farm and gather intelligence. However, he didn’t know how to farm – he was
from an urban background – and this was quickly spotted. The soldier was then executed.
The Maoists were not completely impervious to inﬁltration, however and their internal surveil-
lance networks were breached before the battle of Bhalubang. The Armed Police Force (APF)
garrison of the position had, in fact, been able to turn (and/or bribe) a Maoist company comman-
der in to providing details of the upcoming attack on their position.33 Although the commander
was eventually executed once suspicions had been aroused. However, overall, in international
terms the Maoists were remarkably closed and secretive and suﬀered no real high-level breaches in
the ten years of war, which is quite remarkable. Even when one considers the poor record of the
state security services in dealing with the Maoist threat, this is an impressive testimony to the high
levels of internal trust and discipline within the movement.
Inﬁltration
Terrorists and insurgents who penetrate state institutions can derive at least ﬁve signiﬁcant
beneﬁts34: information; opportunities to plant false information; stealing resources; identiﬁcation
of targets for bribery or recruitment; and, delegitimising the state’s war eﬀort. Inﬁltration is an old
and highly eﬀective target used by both insurgent groups and also state security services. There
are contemporary examples of inﬁltration by Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangaldesh, Al Qaeda in the United
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Arab Emirates and of various insurgents in Iraq, as well as signiﬁcant use of inﬁltration by the UK
security services in Northern Ireland.35
We do not really know the extent of Maoist penetration of the Nepali state, although we do
know that at one stage a Government Home Minister was providing funds to the Maoists, possibly
under duress.36 At the same time, it is also widely believed – including amongst the Maoists – that
information about speciﬁc battles came from Nepal Army oﬃcers, e.g. intelligence on Nepal Army
positions at Dang was provided to Ananta and Baldev by a Major General who was later elected to
the Constitutional Assembly under the Maoist Party.37
The Maoists themselves claim to have had signiﬁcant use for ‘useful idiots’ within the intelligence
services of Nepal, particularly the NID. Speciﬁcally, for some of the war period the Chief of NID was
a former communist party cadre from Rolpa District and under King Gyanendra, he became very
close to the Maoists. However, interviews from both sides suggest that the eﬀectiveness of the NID
was in question, so the value of the inﬁltration is diﬃcult to assess.38 It is, however, very clear that the
Maoists did have access to the military and the RNA. Although the actual numbers are diﬃcult to
obtain, and the Maoists themselves are unsure of absolute ﬁgures, there is clear evidence of excellent
access to documentation and approaches such as oﬃcer and specialist training.39
Amongst the inﬁltration and reliance on local, trusted individual networks, the Maoists also
mounted more sophisticated intelligence operations. In Dang I interviewed a former Maoist
intelligence Commander, Milan. He had been the chief of intelligence for the district surrounding
Dang, a province of signiﬁcance since it is in the Terai but is also the direct corridor between the
Maoist dominated hill regions of Rohlpa and Rukum and the Indian border.40 Milan was a very
sophisticated intelligence operative in Butwal in the Terai. He was a senior Maoist commander who
was known (his codename) by the security services. He was a zonal intelligence commander and
controlled more than one district and was therefore a leading target for the state security services.
However, during the war he established himself as the head of a small NGO working on migratory
links between the hill regions and the Terai. This furnished himwith a very plausible alternative identity
and also an excuse to travel on his scooter up to Rolpa. His identity also incorporated membership of
other political parties, including the NC and UML. He dressed like a western NGO activist and lived
a western lifestyle. He lived in a ﬂat close to the local army headquarters where he regularly played
volleyball with the oﬃcers coming oﬀ duty. He also described himself as being ‘very friendly’ with
a number of oﬃcers wives. His closest relationship was with an intelligence oﬃcer based at HQ who
was responsible for tracking down this ‘notorious Maoist, Milan’. In fact they discussed various
strategies for capturing Milan.41 Milan was essentially able to embed himself in to the military
architecture and provide good quality intelligence using the concentric circles model.
Was it eﬀective?
Overall, the diﬀerence in intelligence availability from the local population reﬂected the overall
strategic situation of the war, with the Maoists controlling hill and rural areas and the government
(more or less) controlling the Terai and the Kathmandu Valley. This undoubtedly further contrib-
uted to the stalemate that eventually developed. However, the Maoists did mount successful
intelligence operations in those areas, usually reﬂecting the concentric circles of activists outlined
above. Baldev is a senior Divisional Commander and a close associate of Prachanda (he is one of
the core ﬁve senior commanders). As such he is one of the very core of Maoists that have been
involved from the beginning and are among the most trusted. He was also largely responsible for
logistics and intelligence planning throughout much of the war. However, as an illustration of
central trust networks in action, he is excellent since he spent two years as a ‘businessman’ in the
Terai running a photographic shop as a cover for an intelligence clearing house. He established
a network based on family who came in to the shop and passed on information and was very
diﬃcult to break down. Beyond this was a circle of trusted friends and volunteers who provided
further information.42
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In many ways, this is illustrative of the trust networks at the heart of Maoist operations. For a start, one
would think that someone of the stature of Baldevwould be a high risk person to place in a risky situation
in the ﬁeld. However, it does imply that there was a shortage of highly capable intelligence oﬃcers that
could also be trusted to take independent decisions in the ﬁeld. The fact that Baldev also had expertise in
something saleable like photography also helped with this ‘horses for courses’ argument.
The Maoists were undoubtedly lucky in facing an inadequate enemy, obsessed with
Kathmandu and also lacking understanding of the Nepali countryside. The attitude of the
political elite towards the ‘backward peasantry’ was so entrenched that it was even present
in the brahminical approaches to puritan living under the Maoists themselves.43 Nevertheless
the Maoists proved far more able than the government security services in mobilising local
communities to act in their own interests, particularly in the base areas where there may have
been historical ethnic animosity against the state. The mass recruitment of the Maoists also
strengthened some of these relationships. As Nickson44 pointed out three years before the start
of the war itself, the Shining Path had beneﬁtted from a disillusioned aspirational youth who
were in or had completed some form of education and did not want to continue as farmers,
but had suﬀered disappointment in pursuing alternative career paths. This class of youth
bought in to the alternative vision of a society oﬀered by the Maoists that included opportu-
nities for them to progress in ways that the existing patriarchal and hierarchical system did not,
but they also provided a link between the ideology of the Maoists and the families they had
come from at the local level. Thus, whilst the leadership may have resembled their opposite
numbers, they were able to open channels to the local populations more easily, and to develop
relationships whereby they were regarded as less of a threat to civilians than the security
services.45 Again the perceived unpredictable violence of the security services and the fact that
they were responsible for the majority of disappearances, undermined government attempts to
deal with the local population in many areas and provided additional potential informants for
the Maoists.46
In terms of the organisation and management of Maoist intelligence operations, they relied
overwhelmingly on HUMINT, supplemented by use of internet and open source information.
Their two main sources of information were undoubtedly from people on the ground – both
their own troops and also civilians – and also through inﬁltration. Although it is diﬃcult to
accurately measure the eﬀectiveness of inﬁltration, it was undoubtedly successful in terms of
gaining an intelligence upper hand over the badly co-ordinated state security institutions.
Whilst most of the evidence for this is anecdotal, this is hardly rare within this type of
intelligence analysis and it suggests that the Maoists were able to gain traction with individuals
up to very high levels of the state institutions themselves. Most of the intelligence was put to
the use one might expect in an asymmetrical war, particularly assassination, kidnapping and
degradation of state power as well as supporting more conventional warfare like ambushes and
attacks on police stations.
The Maoists intelligence structures were centred around a CIB that was a central clearing
house for information fed up by the centralised structures to a high command centred around
a core of trusted individuals. The Maoist structure was both centralised and decentralised in
some ways with some decisions delegated to the local level, particularly to District
Commanders, who were able to carry out certain types of operation without permission from
the centre. However, these boundaries were very clearly delineated and enforced. The rigours
of party discipline were enforced through strict rules and transgressions could be punished
severely. Potential transgressions ranged from carrying out actions that did not ﬁt with party
policy, or without approval or, usually, where they were held to be for private reasons rather
than for the good of the movement. The puritanical streak of the Maoists in upholding what
they saw as a form of ‘righteousness’ could lead to signiﬁcant punishment for transgressions
including demotion, being thrown out of the party and even execution.
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International solidarity and the role of India
The international solidarity element is more diﬃcult to get at. Whereas there are commentators who
casually claim that the entire peace agreement was ‘down to India’, usually with no evidence, the actual
position of India was far more complex and muchmore opaque. At various times during the war, India,
or parts of the Indian state, local state and some powerful individuals supported almost all groups
within the struggle. Oﬃcially the Indian Government supported the Nepali state and army, and this was
certainly subject to tangible support in terms of arms and munitions and also training.
However, the Maoists were also able to access signiﬁcant support within India. Several high
proﬁle Maoist leaders lived for considerable lengths of time in India openly and were rarely under
threat. In interviews with Maoist combatants it also became clear that some had received training
within India (although from whom remains somewhat murky) and certainly serious Maoist casual-
ties were treated in Indian hospitals.47 The relationship between India and Nepal and various Indian
organisations, including RAW48 is complex partly because the relationship between some of the
Indian agencies is also not always clear.49 We will return to this issue below, but in some ways, the
Indian position was one of talking to everyone.50 In other words they placed a bet on everyone in
the race rather than just on one horse.
In an interview with a former RAW oﬃcer, Jha states that RAW had an ongoing policy of
maintaining dialogue with the Maoists even when they were nominally backing the Government
in Kathmandu, but this is hardly surprising.51 However, the palace clearly did not see it that way
and spoke of ‘doublespeak’ on the part of India and even blamed India for covert support for the
Maoists. This would certainly chime with the use of the open border for the transport and
treatment of Maoist wounded, for example, as well as the lack of action taken against senior
Maoist leaders whilst they located in India itself. It should be noted here that several analysts have
spent a lot of time trying to ascertain the relationship between the Maoists and India but to little
avail.52 In addition, it is also clear that had the political factions in Nepal been able to work
together, then the position of the Indian Government might have been easier. As it was, the
diﬀerent anti-Mao factions spent so much time ﬁghting that the only way to end the conﬂict was
politically – and that meant making a deal with the Maoists.
In fact, mirroring the disharmony on the part of the anti-Mao movement in Nepal, the Indian
Government was doing diﬀerent things in relation to the Maoists and diﬀerent elements of Indian
Government had diﬀerent linkages in to Nepali institutions, notably the RAW and the Intelligence
Bureau (IB). This relationship came to a head with the arrest of Matrika Yadav, a Madhesi leader at
the behest of IB but against the wishes of RAW. That is before we consider any conﬂict of interest
between intelligence oﬃcers and diplomats. There is a certain mythology and mysticism about the
role of India in Nepal, but in this case it is diﬃcult to ascribe a monolithic policy that deﬁned
a constant policy to the Maoists or the Nepali Government over the whole period. As Jha suggests,
individuals played a role in how this policy changed over time, suggesting that several RAW
oﬃcials changed their opinions once they had met with Bhatterai and particularly Prachanda,
who clearly impressed them.
However, it is also not entirely true to say that India had no policy on Nepal. India has long
history of carrying out similar approaches in Kashmir and Nagaland, which can be characterised as
‘engage, promise, coerce, divide, frustrate, corrupt, lure, disappoint’, whilst giving up nothing. This
was coupled with a policy of supporting Bhatterai as a counter to Prachanda, something that was
described to me as a policy of ‘always supporting the second strongest person in every movement
to keep the leader honest’.53 What they did in this war was to do this on every side, so they backed
every player in a complex and unpredictable game.
Neither is it clear how much support the Nepali Maoists were able to get from similar move-
ments. Shining Path is in Peru and there is no indication that the international revolutionary
movements that profess fraternal support provided any practical help, or indeed were in
a position to do so.54 The Naxalites in India, however, were in a better geographical position to
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help, but again, interviews with former combatants and commanders within Nepal gave rise to no
evidence of collusion beyond occasional meetings or liaison oﬃcers. Again, given the shortage of
resources faced by both the Naxalites and the Maoists it is diﬃcult to determine who was in
a position to support whom.
The ﬁnal point to make about external inﬂuences is that the Maoists had very little access to
external economic networks that could generate resources. Whereas the Shining Path and
Colombian FARC could call on extensive networks of drug trading, the Maoists had to rely on
internal sources of income that were largely criminal, including kidnapping, extortion and robbery,
including both bank-robbery and theft of private property from ‘class enemies’. In addition, once
the violence had spread to the Terai, deforestation accelerated rapidly as the Moaists were able to
strip out trees and sell the wood over the border in India. Despite this, the Maoists were never able
to mobilise suﬃcient resources to really compete on an equal basis with the Government forces.
Finally, as with anything political in Nepal, one must consider the puzzling position of India
during the war. As confusing as a yoga set, the Indian position varied during the war according to
which institution was involved at any one time and which individuals were then engaged. Broadly
the position shifted from a position at the beginning of supporting a supposedly compliant King, to
by the end being at least open to the Maoists. However, in between, India was accused by both
sides of being biased and Indian policy cannot be said to have been entirely consistent in taking
sides. In the end, the Indian involvement was predominantly arms-length and both supportive and
disappointing for both sides. Both sides beneﬁtted from some degree of Indian support at various
times, but then also claimed that India supported to other side. The reality was that India was faced
with a confusing mass of actors, a complex war and no clear outcome and took the view that ﬁrstly,
she would support everyone to some degree so that eventually someone sympathetic would win,
but, secondly, that she would continue a historical approach of keeping domestic actors weak by
supporting rivals within the same party. Thus the Indian intelligence services have tended to
support, not the leaders of the political parties, but those who were regarded as the main rivals
from the leadership within each party.
Conclusions
Overall, the eﬀectiveness of the intelligence is diﬃcult to measure. One can infer, of course, that it
was very good in that the Maoists clearly controlled the countryside and large parts of the urban
areas within Nepal. There is also anecdotal information from senior army oﬃcers who frequently
state that the Maoists knew how many and where any troops were and were ready when they
deployed. At the same time, the state knew very little about the Maoist movement itself and was
unable to penetrate the Maoist movement itself during the war, suggesting that the overall picture
was a mixture of strong Maoist intelligence and weak government intelligence structures.
The Maoist intelligence strategy raises several challenging questions about approaches to
intelligence processes. Gentry, proposes an interesting typology for analysing a broad scope of
non-state intelligence operations.55 Intelligence is typically a core party concern in most commu-
nist movements and this is clearly reﬂected in the experience of the Nepali Maoists. Intelligence
was integrated to the degree that some senior Maoist cadres integrated intelligence and senior
command positions in themselves, although it should be noted that it was uncommon to do both
of these things at the same time. Baldev’s experience is relevant here since he was the intelligence
commander, but within this role he also carried out ﬁeld operations at particular times as well. In
general, the structure of Maoist intelligence surrounded the CIB, which acted as a central training
agency, a clearing house for intelligence from the districts and an information processing unit to
provide strategic intelligence to the senior command. At the same time, the CIB also enforced strict
rules about localised decision-making by District Commanders.
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Notes
1. Gentry and Spencer, “Colombia’s FARC”.
2. Krause, “Insurgent Intelligence”.
3. Although there is some development of work on the Irish Republican Army, Hezbollah and Al-Quaeda – see
Ilardi, ‘Irish Republican Army Counterintelligence’,; Ilardi, ‘Al Qaeda’s Operational Intelligence’; Ilardi, ‘Al
Qaeda’s Counterintelligence; Wege, ‘Hezbollah’s Communication System’; Wege, ‘Hizbellah’s
Counterintelligence Apparatus’.
4. Van Puyvelde and Curtis, “Standing on the shoulders of giants”.
5. See, for example, Bowyer Bell, ‘The armed struggle’.
6. Gentry and Spencer “Colombia’s FARC”.
7. See, for example: Pettigrew, Maoists at the Hearth; Mehta, and Lawoti ‘Military dimensions of the ‘People’s War’;
Lecomte-Tilouine, Hindu Kingship.
8. I was oﬃcially employed ﬁrstly by Saferworld, an NGO, in Nepal and then by a local Nepali organisation that
received UK Government funding via the Department for International Development. They spent part of their
funding on me. My role was never oﬃcially as a representative of the UK Government – in fact the UK
Government went to great lengths to explain this to me several times!
9. In general, ranks within the Maoists follow a broad Chinese revolutionary model of not having formal ranks,
but using the designation ‘commander’ after the type of unit, i.e. Platoon Commander; Company Commander;
Battalion Commander; Brigade Commander; Division Commander. The intelligence oﬃcer would be desig-
nated as ‘commander’ and may be linked to a unit or a geographical area, e.g. ‘Zonal Commander’.
10. Note that throughout this paper I mainly use the codenames assigned to each individual. This was extremely
widespread during the insurgency and for several years these were the only names I knew these individuals
by.
11. In particular I would like to acknowledge: General Rana, General Chand and General Sharma, all of whom
provided valuable insight, and also Trilochan Malla, amongst others, who provided comments and insight in to
military intelligence at that time.
12. Hutt, Himalayan ‘People’s War’.
13. The Nepali Congress mirrors other liberal democratic parties in South Asia. A critical party in terms of gaining
democracy in 1990 and active for decades as the main opposition to the Pranchayat rule, the NC is one of the
main three parties along with the Maoists and the UML. The NC was actually in power when the conﬂict
began. The Communist Party of the Nepal (United Marxist Leninist), known as the UML operates more like
a moderate leftist party of a social democratic type, although the UML is the original communist party of
Nepal. Lawoti, Contentious Politics.
14. Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) of Nepal data.
15. Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, http://www.rahat.gov.np/uploads/4330 File Ashad1.pd.
16. Thomas A. Marks, ‘Insurgency in Nepal’, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003.
17. I interviewed both the APF commander in this base and the Maoist commander for this battle, as well as
several other Maoist commanders. The APF had actually bribed one of the Maoist Company Commanders who
was then executed by the insurgents. The Maoists attacked the base three times but took very bad casualties.
18. It was this battle that partly persuaded Prachanda and the Maoist commanders that the war was reaching
a stalemate and whilst they could continue ﬁghting, it was unlikely that they could win (interview with
Prachanda, 2015).
19. With the exception of my colleague, Andrew Nickson, an expert in Peru who happened to be in Nepal and
spotted similar underlying features, which he pointed out in Nickson ‘Democratisation and the growth of
communism in Nepal’.
20. This terminology was widespread amongst the Maoist cadres and used in everyday conversation. As
a negotiator, I was frequently told that I was ‘unscientiﬁc’ if I disagreed with the prevailing ideology, but
note that this was not rigid. What was scientiﬁc could change over time through persuasion or circumstance.
21. Marks, ‘Insurgency in Nepal’.
22. In one interview, a senior commander smiled at me and stated that he ‘had internalised the political
commissar’ and so had no need of political guidance.
23. The former political oﬃcers I spoke to often described situations where they were actually defending, and
explaining military decisions taken by themselves and the commander.
24. Interviews with intelligence oﬃcers, Dang and Rohlpa, May 2015.
25. This would include activities like surveillance of recruits and their families, recruitment, inﬁltration and also
assassination of those viewed as having betrayed the movement.
26. This should not be underestimated. During their life in the cantonments more than 70% of the Maoist army
passed its school leaving certiﬁcate. This reﬂected a commitment to education and well-being that underlined
much of the Maoists approach to emancipation and peasant consciousness (Fieldwork, 2015–2016).
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27. I interviewed several oﬃcers, both serving and retired for this work, but also in the course of working on
demobilisation and transitional justice. However, in their case anonymity is prudent.
28. See note 2 above.
29. Human Intelligence (HUMINT), as opposed to signals intelligence (SIGINT).
30. A former military intelligence source claimed that several Maoists were captured whilst ﬁlming during
reconnaissance (interview, 2016).
31. Interview with Baldev, Gokarna, 2010.
32. This came up in a discussion with a former Maoist Company Commander in Liwang, 2011.
33. This was veriﬁed by interviews both with the Maoists and also with the APF commander in the ﬁeld at that
time.
34. Rosenau ‘Subversion and Insurgency’.
35. Rosenau, ‘Subversion and Insurgency’. For Northern Ireland there is an extensive literature on intelligence
operations by both sides, but for a good insider account of Special Branch activity see Matchett Secret Victory.
36. This information came from an interview with a former Prime Ministerial Adviser to the Nepali Congress during
the war.
37. Interviews with senior Maoist commanders, conﬁrmed by military intelligence sources. This person was Kumar
Fudong.
38. Opinions on the NID are extremely divided, although interviewees from military intelligence, civilian govern-
ment and the Maoists were all of the opinion that the NID was ineﬀective as an intelligence organisation
during the war, despite some evidence of UK support (see Bell, Kathmandu).
39. The Maoists had access to signiﬁcant training materials via this source, as well as early weapons training and
advice from former British Ghurkhas.
40. Milan is an interesting character and had used many of his connections to build a very successful property
empire. His former comrades all noted that he was now the wealthiest Maoist they knew. At the beginning of
the interview, which I partly conducted with Baldev, Baldev himself ordered Milan to tell me the truth and
gave him permission to answer my questions.
41. This created much hilarity amongst the Maoists, with Milan being something of a raconteur. The intelligence
colonel(who will remain anonymous) went on to become head of military intelligence.
42. I know Baldev well, since he was a leading ﬁgure in the peace negotiations. We have been discussing
intelligence since 2009.
43. Shah and Pettigrew ‘Windows in to a revolution’.
44. Nickson, ‘A Peruvian scenario in the making?’
45. See Shah and Pettigrew, ‘Windows in to a revolution’.
46. According the Human Rights Commission virtually all human rights crimes reported to them during and since
the war have been state perpetrated (interviews, Kathmandu, 2015, 2016, 2017). At the same time, as of time
of writing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has received around 50,000 cases from the war period,
around 75% of which are property crimes. Of the remainder, the majority of cases relate to state crimes against
humanity rather than Maoist. That is not to say that the Maoists did not perpetrate crimes against humanity,
but it is a question of scale.
47. This was also clear when visiting battleﬁelds in the Terai where the Maoists explained how they smuggled the
wounded over the border.
48. The Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) or the Indian Secret Service.
49. Jha Battles of the New Republic for an interesting discussion of speciﬁc links, including interviews with RAW
oﬃcers.
50. See Jha Battles of the New Republic.
51. Jha, ‘Battles of the New Republic’. This was also supported by ﬁeld interviews on the Maoist side.
52. It is also worth noting that India was not the only actor with open communication with the Maoists – both of
the NC factions (Deuba and Koirala) kept links open.
53. This was reported to me in an interview with a former NC adviser to the prime Minister.
54. Although Prachanda himself claimed to have a letter of support from Shining Path following correspondence
between them.
55. Gentry ‘Toward a Theory of Non-State Actors’ Intelligence’.
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